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Abstract—In this paper, a novel transmission strategy, referred
to as mapping-varied spatial modulation, is proposed for physical
layer security, where the transmitter varies mapping patterns for
the radiated information and the antenna information of spatial
modulation, based on the instantaneous pattern of legitimate
channel quality information that is unknown to eavesdroppers.
Therefore, eavesdroppers cannot successfully decode the con-
fidential information and the transmission over the legitimate
link is secured from the wire-tap of eavesdroppers, without
relying on higher-layer encryption. An important virtue of the
proposed transmission strategy is that the transmitter does not
need to know eavesdroppers’ channels states at all. To further
demonstrate the advantage of this scheme, its secrecy rate
was formulated for the purpose of facilitating the performance
evaluation. Moreover, illustrative numerical results pertaining to
the metrics of ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability
not only substantiate the validity of the proposed transmission
strategy, but also provide useful references for the system design
with the mapping-varied spatial modulation, from the view of
physical layer security.
Index Terms—Multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) wire-
tap channel, physical layer security, secrecy rate, spatial modu-
lation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since information-theoretic framework of secrecy commu-
nications was initiated by Shannon [1], fundamental capability
of physical layer security to provide confidentiality has been
characterized and developed to break the tradition that security
is a higher-layer issue; see e.g., [2]–[5] and references therein.
Without relying on higher-layer encryption, inherent random-
ness of the legitimate link is exploited to make eavesdroppers
unable to extract the confidential information from their wire-
tapping, thus achieving physical layer security [6], [7].
Especially in time division duplexing (TDD) systems, chan-
nel reciprocity between the transmitter and its intended re-
ceiver is validated at no additional bandwidth cost [8], [9],
where the intended/legitimate receiver’s channel state infor-
mation (CSI) is perfectly known at the transmitter. As there is
no CSI feedback signal, eavesdroppers can never obtain any
knowledge of the CSI over the legitimate link.
On the other hand, a key assumption for the study of secrecy
capacity is the eavesdropper’s CSI known by the transmitter.
In a genie-aided multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) wire-
tap channel, where the instantaneous eavesdropper’s CSI is
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available at the transmitter, a suitable optimization based upon
this CSI over the transmitter’s input covariance matrix can
achieve perfect secrecy capacity [10], [11]. If only the statistics
of eavesdropper’s CSI is available at the transmitter, artificial
noise that is orthogonal to the legitimate receiver can be in-
jected to degrade the channel quality of the eavesdropper [12],
[13].
However, in practice, it is infeasible or impossible for
the transmitter to obtain the eavesdropper’s CSI. If neither
instantaneous CSI from the transmitter to the eavesdropper
nor its statistics is available at the transmitter, an approach
to power allocation is suggested in [14] for artificial noise
injection over MIMO wire-tap channels. Moreover, an artificial
noise scheme is proposed in [15] for single-input-single-output
systems over multi-path channels.
Against this backdrop, we intend to exploit the concept of
spatial modulation for the physical layer security over MIMO
wire-tap channels where the eavesdropper’s CSI is not known
by the transmitter at all. Originally, spatial modulation is
initiated to improve the spectral efficiency of multi-antenna
channels in an open-loop link, where the transmitter does not
know the legitimate receiver’s CSI [16]–[18]. The performance
of this approach has been considered in various networks [19]–
[21]. Recently, optimal spatial-design [22] and power alloca-
tion [23] have been developed for spatial modulation in closed-
loop links to further increase its achievable data rate, where
the CSI over the legitimate link is available at the transmitter.
In the literature, spatial modulation has been investigated
from the view of physical layer security. In [24], the security
rate of spatial modulation with finite-alphabet input is analysed
with the assumption that instantaneous eavesdropper’s CSI is
genie-provided at the transmitter. In [25], jamming signals are
injected into the transmission of spatial modulation to enhance
the security. In [26], the indices of transmit antennas in spatial
modulation are defined based on the instantaneous legitimate
CSI for the sake of security. In [27], the security of spatial
modulation is enhanced by the full-duplex receiver’s jamming
signals.
Different from previous works on the security issues of
traditional spatial modulation, a novel transmission strategy
is proposed in this paper to achieve physical layer security.
With the proposed scheme, the transmitter varies the mapping
patterns of both antenna information and radiated information
in the spatial modulation, according to instantaneous channel
state pattern over the legitimate link. Hence, this scheme
is referred to as mapping-varied spatial modulation. Since
unauthorized eavesdroppers that are blind to the legitimate
channel state cannot know the information mapping patterns
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2of the moment, they are not able to decode the confidential
information transmitted over the legitimate link.
Unlike the physical layer security schemes with precoding
or artificial noise injection, the proposed mapping-varied spa-
tial modulation does not engage the random channel properties
of the legitimate link in the transmitted signal shaping, but
utilizes the randomness of channel state patterns over the
legitimate link to vary the information mapping patterns at the
transmitter. The fundamental advantages behind this scheme
are three-fold: (i) No artificial noise is injected at the trans-
mitter. As such, the transmit power is fully taken by useful
information and high energy efficiency is achieved. (ii) The
transmitted signals are not precoded by instantaneous CSI of
the legitimate link and, therefore, the peak-to-average power
ratio at the transmitter is the same as that of the classical (open-
loop) spatial modulation. (iii) The decoding complexity at the
legitimate receiver is the same as that of the classical (open-
loop) spatial modulation, because the alphabet set that is used
to map the antenna information and the radiated information
conveyed over the legitimate link is the same as that used in
the classical (open-loop) spatial modulation.
The novelty and contribution of this paper are highlighted
below in three aspects.
• Principle: To achieve high secrecy rate with low opera-
tion complexity in the implementation of physical layer
security, the security key is generated by the instanta-
neous channel state over the legitimate link, where neither
the instantaneous information nor the statistical informa-
tion with respect to the channel state from the transmitter
to the eavesdropper is available at the transmitter.
• Approach: The security key is reflected on the mapping
pattern of spatial modulation, which is varied according
to the instantaneous pattern of the channel state over
the legitimate link. Note that, spatial modulation is a
universal scenario to exploit this approach. Actually, this
approach can be devoted to constellation modulation
(equivalent to varying the mapping pattern of radiated
information) or space keying (equivalent to varying the
mapping pattern of antenna information) as well.
• Evaluation: To determine the confidentiality capability
offered by the proposed mapping-varied spatial modula-
tion at the presence of eavesdroppers, the instantaneous
secrecy rate is formulated in simple and analytical expres-
sions for both generalized case with Gaussian-distributed
input and practical case with finite-alphabet input.
In detailing the above contributions, the remainder of this
paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the MIMO
wire-tap channel model under study and proposes the novel
transmission strategy, i.e., mapping-varied spatial modulation,
to achieve physical layer security without any eavesdroppers’
CSI available at the transmitter. Besides, the bit error rate
(BER) is compared between the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper, which verifies the validity of the proposed
mapping-varied spatial modulation for physical layer security.
In Section III, the analysis framework of secrecy rate is estab-
lished for the proposed transmission strategy at the presence of
unauthorized eavesdroppers. Based on the theoretical analyses,
Section IV demonstrates numerical results to substantiate the
confidentiality provided by the proposed transmission strategy,
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Fig. 1. MIMO wire-tap channel model.
in terms of ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability.
Finally, this paper is concluded in Section V.
Throughout this paper, the following mathematical notations
are used: Matrices and vectors are denoted by boldface upper-
case and lowercase letters, respectively. In particular, 0M×1
denotes the M × 1 zero vector and IM denotes the M ×M
identity matrix. The transpose, the conjugate transpose and the
modulus operators are denoted by (·)T, (·)† and | · |, respec-
tively. The factorial of a non-negative integer M is denoted
by M !. Moreover, d2 (u, v) denotes the squared Euclidean
distance between signals u and v. In addition, Pr{·} denotes
the probability of an event, and E{·} represents the expectation
(mean) operator. The probability density function (PDF) of a
random variable x is denoted by p(x), and the conditional
PDF of x given an event A is denoted by p(x|A).
II. MAPPING-VARIED SPATIAL MODULATION FOR
PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
In this section, the transmission strategy referred to as
mapping-varied spatial modulation is proposed for physical
layer security over MIMO wire-tap channels, where the eaves-
dropper’s CSI is unavailable at the transmitter. Herein, the
general case is presented firstly and, then, several examples are
given to illustrate the proposed transmission strategy for spe-
cific scenarios. Furthermore, the BER comparisons between
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are reported to
substantiate the security guaranteed by the proposed mapping-
varied spatial modulation.
A. General Case
Consider a MIMO wire-tap channel model shown in Fig. 1,
where the unauthorized eavesdropper Eve (with NE anten-
nas) attempts to reveal the confidential information con-
veyed over the legitimate link, i.e., from the transmitter
Alice (with MA antennas) to the legitimate receiver Bob
(with NB antennas). The fading channels from Alice to
Bob and Eve are denoted by the NB × MA matrix H =
[hnm]NB×MA = [h1,h2, · · · ,hMA ] and the NE×MA matrix
G = [glm]NE×MA = [g1,g2, · · · ,gMA ], respectively, where
the NB × 1 vector hm = [h1m, h2m, · · · , hNB,m]T and the
NE × 1 vector gm = [g1m, g2m, · · · , gNE,m]T contain the
channels coefficients from the mth antenna of Alice to all the
antennas of Bob and Eve, respectively,m = 1, 2, · · · ,MA. All
the channels coefficients involved herein, i.e., hnm and glm for
m = 1, 2, · · · ,MA, n = 1, 2, · · · , NB , l = 1, 2, · · · , NE , are
assumed to be flat-fading over a common narrow-band and
independent of each other.
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3To implement physical layer security, the legitimate receiver
Bob’s CSI, i.e.,H, is available at the transmitter Alice. Specif-
ically in TDD systems, the channel reciprocity is validated at
no additional bandwidth cost, which guarantees both Alice and
Bob have the same knowledge of the CSI over the legitimate
link.
With the initial idea of spatial modulation that is an open-
loop approach, the signals conveyed over the legitimate link
are not designed according to instantaneous legitimate CSI
and, consequently, any (authorized or unauthorized) receivers
can decode the spatially modulated signals as long as estimat-
ing the CSI from the transmitter to themselves.
Different from the traditional spatial modulation, we pro-
pose the mapping-varied spatial modulation for the purpose of
physical layer security, where the transmitter Alice formats the
spatially modulated signals based on instantaneous patterns of
the channel quality information (CQI) over the legitimate link.
The CQI from the mth transmit antenna of Alice to Bob is
denoted by γm = h
†
mhm, m = 1, 2, · · · ,MA; thus, the CQI
pattern of the legitimate link is defined as the permutation
containing all CQI γm, m = 1, 2, · · · ,MA, in descending or
ascending order, i.e., γ♯1 > γ♯2 > · · · > γ♯MA or γ♯1 6
γ♯2 6 · · · 6 γ♯MA , where ♯ denotes the permutation order.
If the CQI pattern is of descending order, ♯1 is the antenna
index pertaining to the highest CQI while ♯MA pertains to the
lowest CQI, and so on. On the contrary, if the CQI pattern is
given in ascending order, ♯1 is the antenna index pertaining to
the lowest CQI and ♯MA pertains to the highest CQI. Either
in descending order or in ascending order, there are MA! CQI
patterns in total over the legitimate link.
Founded on spatial modulation, the information bits to be
transmitted at Alice is expressed as x = [xa,xd], where
xa and xd are the antenna information and the radiated
information, respectively. However, both the mapping of the
antenna information xa onto the antennas indices and the
mapping of the radiated information xd onto the constellation
points are not fixed but varied in terms of instantaneous CQI
pattern over the legitimate link, for the sake of physical layer
security. In the case that Alice adopts Md-point constellation
for the radiated modulation, e.g., Md-PSK or Md-QAM, with
MA transmit antennas, there are Q = Md! mapping patterns
for the radiated information and P = MA! mapping patterns
for the antenna information.
In each transmission, the antenna-information mapping pat-
tern and the radiated-information mapping pattern are de-
termined by Alice according to the CQI pattern over the
legitimate link of the moment. Note that, the number of
antenna-information mapping patterns, MA!, is the same as
that of the CQI patterns over the legitimate link. For each
CQI pattern, there is one and only one antenna-information
mapping pattern corresponding to it. Furthermore, if Md <
MA, the same mapping pattern for radiated information has
to be activated by different CQI patterns, while the mapping
patterns for antenna information are varied with different CQI
patterns. If Md > MA, to make full use of all radiated-
information mapping patterns, different mapping patterns for
radiated information can be alternated in coherent occurrences
with the same CQI pattern, where the same mapping pattern
for antenna information is kept. Without loss of generality, the
pth mapping pattern for the antenna information is denoted by
Tp(·), p = 1, 2, · · · , P , and the qth mapping pattern for the
radiated information is denoted by Mq(·), q = 1, 2, · · · , Q.
At an arbitrary time slot, if the pth CQI pattern occurs in
the legitimate link, the radiated information is modulated by
Alice according to Mq(·) and transmitted from the antenna
that is mapped by the antenna information according to Tp(·).
Thereby, the received baseband signals at Bob and Eve are
obtained by
yB = hTp(xa)Mq(xd) + zB (1)
and
yE = gTp(xa)Mq(xd) + zE, (2)
respectively, where the NB × 1 vectors yB and zB ∼
CN (0NB×1, σ2W INB) contain Bob’s received signals and
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) components, respec-
tively. Meanwhile, the NE × 1 vectors yE and zE ∼
CN (0NE×1, σ2W INE) contain Eve’s received signals and
AWGN components, respectively. The subscript “Tp(xa)”
denotes the index of the transmit antenna activated by the an-
tenna information xa according to the p
th antenna-information
mapping pattern Tp(·). Accordingly, theNB×1 vector hTp(xa)
and theNE×1 vector gTp(xa) contain the channels coefficients
from the activated transmit antenna of Alice to all the antennas
of Bob and Eve, respectively. Moreover, Mq(xd) stands for
Alice’s transmitted symbol mapped by the radiated informa-
tion xd according to the q
th radiated-information mapping
pattern Mq(·).
As Bob always knows the instantaneous CQI pattern of
the legitimate link, the radiated-information mapping pattern
Mq(·) and the antenna-information mapping pattern Tp(·)
adopted by Alice are obvious to Bob. Upon receiving the sig-
nals yB, Bob may decode the radiated information xd and the
antenna information xa via the following two-step maximum-
likelihood algorithm [16]: First, the candidate decisions are
made in terms of
Mq(xˆd,m) = argmin
s∈Mq(·)
d2
(
h†mhms,h
†
myB
)
,
m = 1, 2, · · · ,MA;
(3)
and then, choose xˆd = xˆd,Tp(xˆa) while getting xˆa if and only
if
Tp(xˆa) = argmin
m∈{1,2,··· ,MA}
d2
(
h†mhmMq(xˆd,m),h
†
myB
)
,
(4)
where xˆd and xˆa are Bob’s final decodings of xd and xa,
respectively.
However, since Eve does not know the CQI pattern over
the legitimate link at all, it has to decode Alice’s spatial mod-
ulation by use of anticipated/arbitrary radiated-information
mapping pattern and antenna-information mapping pattern,
denoted by ME(·) and TE(·), respectively. Similar with Bob’s
decoding procedure, the decoding at Eve starts with candidate
decisions made by
ME(x˜d,m) = argmin
s∈ME(·)
d2
(
g†mgms,g
†
myE
)
,
m = 1, 2, · · · ,MA.
(5)
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4Subsequently, Eve’s final decoding for Alice’s antenna infor-
mation xa, denoted by x˜a, is obtained if and only if
TE(x˜a) = argmin
m∈{1,2,··· ,MA}
d2
(
g†mgmME(x˜d,m),g
†
myE
)
,
(6)
whilst Eve’s final decoding for Alice’s radiated information
xd is x˜d = x˜d,TE(x˜a).
After this decoding, Eve can obtain neither correct radi-
ated information nor correct antenna information, because the
probability that the mapping patterns adopted by Eve in its
decoding, ME and TE, are the same as those adopted by
Alice in spatial modulation, Mq and Tp, is very low. In detail,
Pr{ME(·) = Mq(·)} = 1/(Md!), and Pr{TE(·) = Tp(·)} =
1/(MA!). Hence, the secrecy of the confidential information
conveyed over the legitimate link can be guaranteed by the
mapping-varied spatial modulation that is formatted on the
basis of legitimate CQI pattern, and the confidentiality is
improved with the increase in Md and/or MA.
B. Examples
In practice, the key of the mapping-varied spatial modula-
tion design is to make full use of all the radiated-information
mapping patterns and all the antenna-information mapping
patterns, so that eavesdroppers cannot successfully decode the
transmitter’s spatial-modulated information.
Three examples are demonstrated herein to describe the
proposed transmission strategy for physical layer security over
MIMO wire-tap channels, in various cases concerning the
number of radiated constellation points, Md, and the number
of Alice’s transmit antennas, MA.
1) Md = MA: For this case, we take Md = MA = 4
as an example, where Alice adopts QPSK constellation for
the modulation of xd and has 4 transmit antennas for the
modulation of xa. The symbols in the QPSK constellation are
denoted by s1 = +1, s2 = +
√−1, s3 = −1, s4 = −
√−1,
and the mth transmit antenna at Alice is denoted by øm,
m = 1, 2, 3, 4. In this example, there are 24 CQI patterns
over the legitimate link. The number of antenna-information
mapping patterns and that of radiated-information mapping
patterns are the same, i.e., P = Q = 24.
An illustration of the correspondence that pairs the CQI
pattern with the antenna/radiated-information mapping pattern
in this example is provided in Table I, where the CQI patterns
over the legitimate link are given in descending order, with
γ1 = h
†
1h1, γ2 = h
†
2h2, γ3 = h
†
3h3, γ4 = h
†
4h4. For
instance, in the first CQI pattern, the antennas indices ♯m = m,
m = 1, 2, 3, 4, while in the third CQI pattern, ♯1 = 1,
♯2 = 3, ♯3 = 2, ♯4 = 4. In the mapping patterns for both
antenna information and radiated information, the arrow “↔”
represents the processing that maps the information bits on
its left-hand side into the transmit antenna or the constellation
symbol on its right-hand side.
In this illustration, the pth antenna-information mapping
pattern can be expressed as Tp(xa ↔ ø♯m) : B(xa)+1 = ♯m,
p = 1, 2, · · · , 24, and the qth radiated-information mapping
pattern can be expressed as Mq(xd ↔ s♯m) : B(xd)+1 = ♯m,
q = 1, 2, · · · , 24, where B(·) denotes the function of binary
coded decimals, and ♯m is the antenna index in the CQI
pattern. Given a CQI pattern, the antenna information xa =
TABLE I
ILLUSTRATION OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CQI PATTERN AND
ANTENNA/RADIATED-INFORMATIONMAPPING PATTERN IN
MAPPING-VARIED SPATIAL MODULATION WITHMd = MA = 4.
CQI Pattern p
Antenna-Information Radiated-Information
Mapping Pattern (Tp) Mapping Pattern (Mq)
γ1 > γ2 > γ3 > γ4
00 ↔ ø1 01 ↔ ø2 00 ↔ s1 01 ↔ s2
10 ↔ ø3 11 ↔ ø4 10 ↔ s3 11 ↔ s4
γ1 > γ2 > γ4 > γ3
00 ↔ ø1 01 ↔ ø2 00 ↔ s1 01 ↔ s2
10 ↔ ø4 11 ↔ ø3 10 ↔ s4 11 ↔ s3
γ1 > γ3 > γ2 > γ4
00 ↔ ø1 01 ↔ ø3 00 ↔ s1 01 ↔ s3
10 ↔ ø2 11 ↔ ø4 10 ↔ s2 11 ↔ s4
γ1 > γ3 > γ4 > γ2
00 ↔ ø1 01 ↔ ø3 00 ↔ s1 01 ↔ s3
10 ↔ ø4 11 ↔ ø2 10 ↔ s4 11 ↔ s2
γ1 > γ4 > γ2 > γ3
00 ↔ ø1 01 ↔ ø4 00 ↔ s1 01 ↔ s4
10 ↔ ø2 11 ↔ ø3 10 ↔ s2 11 ↔ s3
γ1 > γ4 > γ3 > γ2
00 ↔ ø1 01 ↔ ø4 00 ↔ s1 01 ↔ s4
10 ↔ ø3 11 ↔ ø2 10 ↔ s3 11 ↔ s2
γ2 > γ1 > γ3 > γ4
00 ↔ ø2 01 ↔ ø1 00 ↔ s2 01 ↔ s1
10 ↔ ø3 11 ↔ ø4 10 ↔ s3 11 ↔ s4
γ2 > γ1 > γ4 > γ3
00 ↔ ø2 01 ↔ ø1 00 ↔ s2 01 ↔ s1
10 ↔ ø4 11 ↔ ø3 10 ↔ s4 11 ↔ s3
γ2 > γ3 > γ1 > γ4
00 ↔ ø2 01 ↔ ø3 00 ↔ s2 01 ↔ s3
10 ↔ ø1 11 ↔ ø4 10 ↔ s1 11 ↔ s4
γ2 > γ3 > γ4 > γ1
00 ↔ ø2 01 ↔ ø3 00 ↔ s2 01 ↔ s3
10 ↔ ø4 11 ↔ ø1 10 ↔ s4 11 ↔ s1
γ2 > γ4 > γ1 > γ3
00 ↔ ø2 01 ↔ ø4 00 ↔ s2 01 ↔ s4
10 ↔ ø1 11 ↔ ø3 10 ↔ s1 11 ↔ s3
γ2 > γ4 > γ3 > γ1
00 ↔ ø2 01 ↔ ø4 00 ↔ s2 01 ↔ s4
10 ↔ ø3 11 ↔ ø1 10 ↔ s3 11 ↔ s1
γ3 > γ1 > γ2 > γ4
00 ↔ ø3 01 ↔ ø1 00 ↔ s3 01 ↔ s1
10 ↔ ø2 11 ↔ ø4 10 ↔ s2 11 ↔ s4
γ3 > γ1 > γ4 > γ2
00 ↔ ø3 01 ↔ ø1 00 ↔ s3 01 ↔ s1
10 ↔ ø4 11 ↔ ø2 10 ↔ s4 11 ↔ s2
γ3 > γ2 > γ1 > γ4
00 ↔ ø3 01 ↔ ø2 00 ↔ s3 01 ↔ s2
10 ↔ ø1 11 ↔ ø4 10 ↔ s1 11 ↔ s4
γ3 > γ2 > γ4 > γ1
00 ↔ ø3 01 ↔ ø2 00 ↔ s3 01 ↔ s2
10 ↔ ø4 11 ↔ ø1 10 ↔ s4 11 ↔ s1
γ3 > γ4 > γ1 > γ2
00 ↔ ø3 01 ↔ ø4 00 ↔ s3 01 ↔ s4
10 ↔ ø1 11 ↔ ø2 10 ↔ s1 11 ↔ s2
γ3 > γ4 > γ2 > γ1
00 ↔ ø3 01 ↔ ø4 00 ↔ s3 01 ↔ s4
10 ↔ ø2 11 ↔ ø1 10 ↔ s2 11 ↔ s1
γ4 > γ1 > γ2 > γ3
00 ↔ ø4 01 ↔ ø1 00 ↔ s4 01 ↔ s1
10 ↔ ø2 11 ↔ ø3 10 ↔ s2 11 ↔ s3
γ4 > γ1 > γ3 > γ2
00 ↔ ø4 01 ↔ ø1 00 ↔ s4 01 ↔ s1
10 ↔ ø3 11 ↔ ø2 10 ↔ s3 11 ↔ s2
γ4 > γ2 > γ1 > γ3
00 ↔ ø4 01 ↔ ø2 00 ↔ s4 01 ↔ s2
10 ↔ ø1 11 ↔ ø3 10 ↔ s1 11 ↔ s3
γ4 > γ2 > γ3 > γ1
00 ↔ ø4 01 ↔ ø2 00 ↔ s4 01 ↔ s2
10 ↔ ø3 11 ↔ ø1 10 ↔ s3 11 ↔ s1
γ4 > γ3 > γ1 > γ2
00 ↔ ø4 01 ↔ ø3 00 ↔ s4 01 ↔ s3
10 ↔ ø1 11 ↔ ø2 10 ↔ s1 11 ↔ s2
γ4 > γ3 > γ2 > γ1
00 ↔ ø4 01 ↔ ø3 00 ↔ s4 01 ↔ s3
10 ↔ ø2 11 ↔ ø1 10 ↔ s2 11 ↔ s1
00, 01, 10, 11 is mapped onto the transmit antenna in the order
♯1, ♯2, ♯3, ♯4, and the radiated information xd = 00, 01, 10, 11
is mapped onto the QPSK symbols in the order ♯1, ♯2, ♯3, ♯4
as well. Note that, this rule is for illustration purpose and
the correspondence is not limited by it. In practice, the
correspondence design is very flexible and any one-to-one
correspondence is suitable for pairing the CQI pattern with
Tp or Mq .
During the setting of the legitimate link, a table with
respect to the correspondence between CQI pattern and
antenna/radiated-information mapping pattern, e.g., Table I,
is supposed to be recognized by both Alice and Bob, via
signaling exchange. By looking up this table, Alice prescribes
the mapping patterns of antenna information and radiated
information, according to instantaneous CQI pattern of the
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5TABLE II
ILLUSTRATION OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CQI PATTERN AND
ANTENNA/RADIATED-INFORMATIONMAPPING PATTERN IN
MAPPING-VARIED SPATIAL MODULATION WITHMd = 2,MA = 4.
CQI Pattern p
Antenna-Information Radiated-Information
Mapping Pattern (Tp) Mapping Pattern (Mq)
p = 1, 2, 3, 4, T1 T2 T3 T4
0 ↔ s1 1 ↔ s25, 6, 7, 8, T5 T6 T7 T8
9, 10, 11, 12. T9 T10 T11 T12
p = 13, 14, 15, 16, T13 T14 T15 T16
1 ↔ s1 0 ↔ s217, 18, 19, 20, T17 T18 T19 T20
21, 22, 23, 24. T21 T22 T23 T24
legitimate link, in each transmission. As Bob knows the legit-
imate CQI pattern of the moment as well, it can comprehend
the mapping patterns adopted by Alice and, then, successfully
decode xa and xd transmitted from Alice.
Meanwhile, Eve cannot correctly anticipate the mapping
patterns adopted by Alice in the spatial modulation, because
it does not know the CQI pattern of the legitimate link at all.
The probability that the antenna/radiated-information mapping
patterns anticipated by Eve and adopted by Alice are the same
is Pr{TE(·) = Tp(·)} = Pr{ME(·) = Mp(·)} = 1/24, which
guarantees that Eve only has the probability of 1/Md = 1/4
to correctly guess xd and the probability of 1/MA = 1/4
to correctly guess xa, although figuring out the symbols
transmitted from Alice.
2) Md < MA: For this case, we take Md = 2,MA =
4 as an example, where Alice employs BPSK constellation
for the modulation of xd and has 4 transmit antennas for the
modulation of xa.
In this example, there are 24 CQI patterns over the legiti-
mate link and 24 antenna-information mapping patterns, while
the number of radiated-information mapping patterns is Q =
Md! = 2. An illustration of the correspondence that pairs the
CQI pattern with the antenna/radiated-information mapping
pattern for this example is shown in Table II, where the CQI
patterns and the antenna-information mapping patterns Tp,
p = 1, 2, · · · , 24, are the same as those given in Table I. In
the radiated-information mapping patterns Mq , q = 1, 2, the
BPSK symbols are denoted by s1 = +1 and s2 = −1.
As the number of radiated-information mapping patterns
is less than that of CQI patterns, either of the radiated-
information mapping patterns is shared by 12 CQI patterns,
where Eve successfully decodes xd at the probability of 1/2
and xa at the probability of 1/4.
3) Md > MA: For this case, we take Md = 4,MA =
2 as an example, where Alice employs QPSK constellation
for the modulation of xd and has 2 transmit antennas for the
modulation of xa.
In this example, there are 24 radiated-information mapping
patterns, while the number of CQI patterns and that of the
antenna-information mapping patterns are both equal to P =
MA! = 2. An illustration of the correspondence that pairs the
CQI pattern with the antenna/radiated-information mapping
pattern for this example is shown in Table III, where the
radiated-information mapping patterns Mq , q = 1, 2, · · · , 24,
are the same as those listed in Table I.
To make full use of all the radiated-information mapping
patterns in this example, Mq , q = 1, 2, · · · , 24, they are
TABLE III
ILLUSTRATION OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CQI PATTERN AND
ANTENNA/RADIATED-INFORMATIONMAPPING PATTERN IN
MAPPING-VARIED SPATIALMODULATION WITHMd = 4,MA = 2.
CQI Pattern p Tp Mq
TS 1
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M1
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M2
TS 2
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M3
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M4
TS 3
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M5
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M6
TS 4
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M7
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M8
TS 5
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M9
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M10
TS 6
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M11
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M12
TS 7
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M13
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M14
TS 8
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M15
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M16
TS 9
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M17
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M18
TS 10
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M19
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M20
TS 11
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M21
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M22
TS 12
p = 1: γ1 > γ2 T1: 0 ↔ ø1 1 ↔ ø2 M23
p = 2: γ2 > γ1 T2: 0 ↔ ø2 1 ↔ ø1 M24
divided into 12 groups and each group is composed of 2
radiated-information mapping patterns that are paired with the
2 CQI patterns in one transmission (time slot). The 12 groups
of radiated-information mapping patterns are alternated in 12
successive transmissions and, then, start over for the next 12
transmissions. This process is repeated for every 12 time slots.
For a given 12 consecutive time slots, at the lth time slot (i.e.,
TS l), l = 1, 2, · · · , 12, Alice adoptsM2l−1 for the modulation
of xd if the first CQI pattern (γ1 > γ2) occurs in the legitimate
link, where T1 is exploited for the mapping of xa, while M2l
is adopted for the modulation of xd if the second CQI pattern
(γ2 > γ1) occurs, where T2 is exploited for the mapping of
xa. Thereupon, the probability that Eve correctly decodes xa
is 1/2, and the probability that Eve correctly decodes xd is
1/4.
We remark that, since the number of CQI patterns is always
the same as that of antenna-information mapping patterns,
P = MA!, the pairs between CQI patterns and Tp, p =
1, 2, · · · , P , hold one-to-one correspondence on all occasions.
However, if the number of CQI patterns, P , is not equal to
that of radiated-information mapping patterns, Q = Md!, the
pairs between CQI patterns and Mq , q = 1, 2, · · · , Q, have
either many-to-one correspondence (for P > Q) or one-to-
many correspondence (for P < Q).
C. Bit Error Rate
The BER comparisons between Bob and Eve with the
proposed mapping-varied spatial modulation are reported in
Figs. 2 and 3 for the aforementioned examples withNB, NE =
2, 4 receiving antennas at Bob and Eve.
As is shown in these figures, Bob’s performance is the same
as that of the classical spatial modulation. However, Eve’s
BER converges to 0.5 as the signal-to-noise power ratio (SNR)
increases, which means that Eve cannot obtain any information
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Fig. 2. Bob’s bit error rate (BER) with NB = 2, 4 receiving antennas.
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Fig. 3. Eve’s bit error rate (BER) with NE = 2, 4 receiving antennas.
conveyed over the legitimate link if the mapping-varied spatial
modulation is exploited at Alice.
III. SECRECY RATE OF MAPPING-VARIED SPATIAL
MODULATION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed mapping-
varied spatial modulation for physical layer security over
MIMO wire-tap channels, the analysis framework of its se-
crecy rate is established in this section, for both theoretical
and practical cases.
A. Gaussian-Distributed Input
First, the secrecy rate expression of mapping-varied spatial
modulation is formulated with Gaussian-distributed input to
demonstrate the full benefit for physical layer security that
is derived from the proposed transmission strategy. In the
case of Gaussian-distributed input, we are concerned with
the upper bounds on achievable data rates with finite-alphabet
inputs/modulations in both the legitimate link (Alice–Bob) and
the wire-tapper link (Alice–Eve), by assuming that Alice’s
transmitted signals are restricted to be the random vari-
ables chosen from complex Gaussian distributed codebooks
CN (0, σ2X) with the transmit power σ2X .
The secrecy rate of a wire-tap channel is defined as the
positive difference between the achievable data rates obtained
by the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve),
i.e., if the legitimate link data rate is higher than the wire-
tapper link data rate [6], [7]. Grounded on this definition, the
secrecy rate of the mapping-varied spatial modulation with
Gaussian-distributed input, denoted by Cs, is expressed as
Cs = max{0, CB − CE}, (7)
where CB and CE denote Bob’s and Eve’s achievable data
rates in the case of Gaussian-distributed input, respectively.
As all the legitimate CQI patterns occur at the same
probability 1/P , Bob’s and Eve’s achievable data rates can
be obtained by
CB =
1
P
P∑
p=1
C
(p)
B (8)
and
CE =
1
P
P∑
p=1
C
(p)
E , (9)
respectively, where C
(p)
B and C
(p)
E denote Bob’s and Eve’s
data rates pertaining to the pth CQI pattern over the legitimate
link, respectively. Since their data rates pertaining to all the
legitimate CQI patterns are the same, i.e., C
(1)
B = C
(2)
B =
· · · = C(P )B and C(1)E = C(2)E = · · · = C(P )E , Bob’s and Eve’s
achievable data rates are equal to their own data rates with an
arbitrary CQI pattern of the legitimate link, i.e., CB = C
(p)
B
and CE = C
(p)
E , p = 1, 2, · · · , P .
Given a legitimate CQI pattern, the proposed mapping-
varied spatial modulation is equivalent to the classical spatial
modulation for Bob. As such, the instantaneous data rate of the
legitimate link, i.e., Bob’s achievable data rate CB, is equal to
the instantaneous data rate of the classical spatial modulation,
calculated using
CB = CBa + CBd, (10)
where CBa and CBd stand for the achievable data rates of
Alice’s antenna information xa and radiated information xd,
respectively, accessing Bob with an arbitrary CQI pattern of
the legitimate link.
Based on the derivations in [16] and [28], the item CBa can
be obtained by
CBa =
1
MA
MA∑
m=1
∫
y¯B
p (y¯B|xa ↔ øm)
× log2
p (y¯B|xa ↔ øm)
p(y¯B)
dy¯B,
(11)
where y¯B = h
†
myB is the signal used by Bob’s decoder, as
shown in (3) and (4), with the NB × 1 vector yB given in
(1). Since the radiated information xd is complex-Gaussian
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7distributed, the conditional PDF of y¯B given the antenna
information xa is denoted by
p (y¯B|xa ↔ øm) = 1
πσ2y¯B
exp
(
−|y¯B|
2
σ2y¯B
)
, (12)
where σ2y¯B = (h
†
mhm)
2σ2X+(h
†
mhm)σ
2
W is the variance of y¯B
with respect to the radiated information xd transmitted from
the mth antenna of Alice, and the PDF of y¯B is characterized
as
p(y¯B) =
1
MA
MA∑
m=1
p (y¯B|xa ↔ øm) . (13)
Additionally, the second item on the right-hand side of (10),
CBd, is given by
CBd =
1
MA
MA∑
m=1
log2
(
1 +
σ2X
σ2W
h†mhm
)
. (14)
By substituting (11) and (14) into (10), the instantaneous
data rate of the legitimate link from Alice to Bob, CB, is
achieved.
On the other hand, with the mapping-varied spatial modu-
lation for physical layer security, the probability that eaves-
droppers successfully decode xa is 1/MA, and the probability
that eavesdroppers successfully decode xd is 1/Md. Hence,
the eavesdropper Eve’s achievable data rate is formulated by
CE =
1
MA
CEa +
1
Md
CEd, (15)
where CEa and CEd denote the data rates of xa and xd access-
ing Eve, respectively, in the case that Eve could successfully
decode them, given an arbitrary CQI pattern of the legitimate
link.
For the Gaussian-distributed input, the number of constella-
tion points,Md, is infinite and, accordingly, the second item on
the right-hand side of (15), CEd/Md, equals to 0. In this case,
if Alice’s radiated-information mapping patterns are varied, the
probability that Eve can successfully decode xd approaches 0.
Consequently, Eve’s achievable data rate, given by (15), is
re-written as
CE =
1
MA
CEa, (16)
and CEa is calculated using [16], [28]
CEa =
1
MA
MA∑
m=1
∫
y¯E
p (y¯E|xa ↔ øm)
× log2
p (y¯E|xa ↔ øm)
p(y¯E)
dy¯E,
(17)
where y¯E = g
†
myE is the signal used by Eve’s decoder, as
shown in (5) and (6), with the NE× 1 vector yE given in (2).
The conditional PDF of y¯E given the antenna information xa
is characterized as
p (y¯E|xa ↔ øm) = 1
πσ2y¯E
exp
(
−|y¯E|
2
σ2y¯E
)
, (18)
where σ2y¯E = (g
†
mgm)
2σ2X+(g
†
mgm)σ
2
W is the variance of y¯E
with respect to the radiated information xd transmitted from
the mth antenna of Alice, and the PDF of y¯E is obtained by
p(y¯E) =
1
MA
MA∑
m=1
p (y¯E|xa ↔ øm) . (19)
Then, the instantaneous data rate of the wire-tapper link
from Alice to Eve, CE, is obtained by substituting (17) into
(16).
As a result, the secrecy rate of the proposed mapping-
varied spatial modulation over MIMO wire-tap channels with
Gaussian-distributed input, defined in (7), can be established
by
Cs = max
{
0, CBa + CBd − 1
MA
CEa
}
, (20)
where CBa, CBd and CEa are given by (11), (14) and (17),
respectively.
B. Finite-Alphabet Input
Herein, the secrecy rate of the mapping-varied spatial mod-
ulation is formulated for the practical case with finite-alphabet
input. To keep the consistency in expression, Alice’s transmit
power in this case, i.e., the average energy of Alice’s finite-
alphabet input, is denoted by σ2X and, thereby, the SNR is
ρ = σ2X/σ
2
W .
The definition of secrecy rate over a wire-tap channel [6],
[7] leads to the secrecy rate expression of the mapping-varied
spatial modulation with finite-alphabet input, denoted by Rs,
as
Rs = max{0, RB −RE}, (21)
where RB and RE stand for the data rates achieved by Bob
and Eve, respectively, with finite-alphabet input at Alice.
The data rate achieved by Bob in the mapping-varied spatial
modulation, RB, is equal to that of the classical spatial
modulation with finite-alphabet input. Based on the analysis in
[24],RB can be obtained by (22) at the top of next page, where
the NB × 1 vector uk,k
′
m,m′ = hmsk − hm′sk′ , and (m′, k′) 6=
(m, k) excludes the event when m′ = m and k′ = k occur
together from the summation, i.e., the summation is taken over
m′ = 1, 2, · · · ,MA, k′ = 1, 2, · · · ,Md in three conditions: (i)
m′ 6= m while k′ 6= k; (ii)m′ = m while k′ 6= k; (iii)m′ 6= m
while k′ = k. Moreover, EzB{·} represents the expectation
with respect to Bob’s received AWGN, i.e., zB in (1).
As is shown in (22), for a given channel realization, fB(ρ)
is a decreasing function of the SNR ρ and converges to 1 when
ρ goes to infinity, i.e., lim
ρ→+∞
fB(ρ) = 1. Consequently, as ρ
approaches infinity, the limit of Bob’s instantaneous data rate
RB is
lim
ρ→+∞
RB(ρ) = log2MAMd, (23)
which is equal to the upper bound on the data rate of classical
spatial modulation with MA transmit antennas and Md-point
constellation.
With the mapping-varied spatial modulation adopted by the
transmitter Alice, the eavesdropper Eve successfully decodes
Alice’s antenna information xa at the probability 1/MA and
successfully decodes Alice’s radiated information xd at the
probability 1/Md. Hence, the achievable data rate over the
wire-tapper link with finite-alphabet input, RE, is given by
RE =
1
MA
REa +
1
Md
REd, (24)
where REa and REd denote the data rates pertaining to
the transmissions of xa and xd over the wire-tapper link,
respectively, if they were decoded correctly by Eve.
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8RB = log2MAMd −
1
MAMd
MA∑
m=1
Md∑
k=1
EzB
{
log2
(
1 +
MA∑
m′=1
Md∑
k′=1
(m′,k′) 6=(m,k)
exp
(
−ρ
[(
u
k,k′
m,m′ + zB
)†(
u
k,k′
m,m′ + zB
)− z†BzB
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fB(ρ)
)}
(22)
REa = log2MA −
1
MAMd
MA∑
m=1
Md∑
k=1
EzE
{
log2
(
1 +
MA∑
m′=1
m′ 6=m
exp
(
−ρ
[(
vm,m′ + zE
)†(
vm,m′ + zE
)− z†EzE
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fEa(ρ)
)}
(25)
REd = log2Md −
1
MAMd
MA∑
m=1
Md∑
k=1
EzE
{
log2
(
1 +
MA∑
m′=1
Md∑
k′=1
(m′,k′) 6=(m,k)
exp
(
−ρ(vk,k′m,m′ + zE)†(vk,k′m,m′ + zE)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fEd1(ρ)
)
− log2
(
1 +
MA∑
m′=1
m′ 6=m
exp
(
−ρ(vm,m′ + zE)†(vm,m′ + zE))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fEd2(ρ)
)} (26)
In detail, REa and REd are calculated using (25) and (26),
respectively, where the NE×1 vectors vm,m′ = gmsk−gm′sk
and v
k,k′
m,m′ = gmsk − gm′sk′ , with k, k′ = 1, 2, · · · ,Md,
m,m′ = 1, 2, · · · ,MA. Additionally, EzE{·} stands for the
expectation with respect to Eve’s received AWGN, i.e., zE in
(2).
For a given channel realization, the function fEa(ρ) in
(25) converges to 1 as the SNR ρ approaches infinity, i.e.,
lim
ρ→+∞
fEa(ρ) = 1, and so the limit of REa is obtained by
lim
ρ→+∞
REa(ρ) = log2MA. (27)
Subsequently, in (26), we also have lim
ρ→+∞
fEd1(ρ) = 1 and
lim
ρ→+∞
fEd2(ρ) = 1, which leads to the limit of REd as
lim
ρ→+∞
REd(ρ) = log2Md. (28)
Thus, as ρ goes to infinity, (24) yields the limit of Eve’s
instantaneous data rate as
lim
ρ→+∞
RE(ρ) =
1
MA
log2MA +
1
Md
log2Md. (29)
As a consequence, the secrecy rate of the mapping-varied
spatial modulation with finite-alphabet input, Rs, is achieved
by substituting (22) and (24) into (21). Further, based on (23)
and (29), the limit of the secrecy rate in (21) at the SNR
ρ→ +∞ is
lim
ρ→+∞
Rs(ρ) =
MA − 1
MA
log2MA +
Md − 1
Md
log2Md. (30)
Note that, this limit is a constant, unchanged with varying
channel realizations. Specifically, in the case of large MA and
Md, i.e., MA ≫ 1, Md ≫ 1, we have
lim
ρ→+∞
Rs(ρ) = log2MA + log2Md, (31)
which equals to the limit of Bob’s data rate in (23), i.e.,
lim
ρ→+∞
Rs(ρ) = lim
ρ→+∞
RB(ρ). That is, if the number of
Alice’s transmit antennas, MA, and the number of radiated
constellation points, Md, are much greater than 1, the limit of
the secrecy rate with mapping-varied spatial modulation is the
same as the limit of the achievable data rate over the legitimate
link, in high-SNR region.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
To verify the capability of physical layer security offered by
the mapping-varied spatial modulation and get further insights
on its merits, in this section we numerically illustrate the secu-
rity performance of the proposed transmission strategy in the
metrics of ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability,
based on the mathematical establishment in Section III.
Without loss of generality, the security performance of
the proposed transmission strategy will be investigated over
Rayleigh fading channels, for two scenarios:
i> The legitimate and wire-tapper links are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), where all the channels
coefficients, over both the legitimate link and the wire-
tapper link, satisfy independent and identical complex
Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and unit-variance,
i.e., hnm, glm ∼ CN (0, 1), ∀m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,MA}, n ∈
{1, 2, · · · , NB}, l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NE}.
ii> The legitimate and wire-tapper links are independent
and non-identically distributed (i.n.i.d.), where the chan-
nel power gain of the wire-tapper link is twice that
of the legitimate link. In detail, the channels coeffi-
cients in the legitimate link, hnm ∼ CN (0, 1), ∀m ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,MA}, n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NB}, whereas the chan-
nels coefficients in the wire-tapper link, glm ∼ CN (0, 2),
∀m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,MA}, l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NE}.
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Fig. 4. Ergodic secrecy rate of the proposed mapping-varied spatial
modulation with NB = 1 antenna at Bob and NE = 1 antenna at Eve,
over i.i.d. and i.n.i.d. links. Also shown is Bob’s ergodic date rate, which is
equal to the ergodic data rate of classical spatial modulation.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
To begin with, we consider the metric of ergodic secrecy rate
that is defined as E{Cs} in the case of Gaussian-distributed
input and E{Rs} in the case of finite-alphabet input, where
Cs and Rs are given by (7) and (21), respectively.
In the case of Gaussian-distributed input, if the legitimate
link and the wire-tapper link are i.i.d., the ergodic date rate
of Alice’s antenna information xa accessing Bob is equal to
that of xa accessing Eve if Eve could successfully decode it,
i.e., E{CBa} = E{CEa} = E{Ca}, and so does the ergodic
date rates pertaining to Alice’s radiated information xd, i.e.,
E{CBd} = E{CEd} = E{Cd}, where E{Ca} and E{Cd}
denote the ergodic data rates of xa and xd in the classical
spatial modulation, respectively.
From (20), the ergodic secrecy rate of the mapping-varied
spatial modulation with Gaussian-distributed input, E{Cs}, in
the i.i.d. scenario, is approximately equal to MA−1MA E{Ca} +E{Cd}. If MA ≫ 1, this ergodic secrecy rate converges to the
ergodic date rate of the legitimate link, which is also equal
to the ergodic date rate of classical spatial modulation, i.e.,
E{Ca}+ E{Cd}.
In Fig. 4, the ergodic secrecy rates of the mapping-varied
spatial modulation, E{Cs} and E{Rs}, are reported for the
i.i.d. and i.n.i.d. scenarios, where both Bob and Eve are single-
antenna devices, i.e., NB = NE = 1. For the sake of
comparison, Bob’s ergodic data rates with Gaussian-distributed
input, E{CB}, and with finite-alphabet input, E{RB}, are also
plotted in this figure, where CB and RB are given by (10)
and (22), respectively. Elaborating slightly further, the gap
between E{Cs} and E{CB} is equivalent to Eve’s ergodic
data rate with Gaussian-distributed input, E{CE}, whilst the
gap between E{Rs} and E{RB} is equivalent to Eve’s ergodic
data rate with finite-alphabet input, E{RE}, where CE and RE
are given in (16) and (24), respectively.
As is shown in Fig. 4, E{Cs} approaches E{CB} with
the increase in the number of antennas at the transmitter
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Fig. 5. Ergodic secrecy rate of the proposed mapping-varied spatial
modulation with MA = 4 antennas at Alice and NB = 2 antennas at Bob, in
the case of Gaussian-distributed input over i.i.d. and i.n.i.d. links. Also shown
is Bob’s ergodic data rate, which is equal to the ergodic data rate of classical
spatial modulation.
Alice, MA. When MA = 8, the gap between E{Cs} and
E{CB} is negligible. These phenomena hold in both i.i.d. and
i.n.i.d. scenarios. That is, even if the channel condition of the
wire-tapper link is better than that of the legitimate link, the
eavesdropper’s ergodic data rate cannot be improved at all
in the case of Gaussian-distributed input. On the other hand,
with finite-alphabet input, the gap between E{Rs} and E{RB}
converges to a constant log2MA/MA + log2Md/Md as the
SNR ρ increases, in both i.i.d. and i.n.i.d. scenarios. At low
SNRs, E{Rs} in the i.n.i.d. scenario is a bit lower than that
in the i.i.d. scenario.
Then, the effects of spatial correlation and channel esti-
mation over the legitimate link on the security performance
E{Cs} and Bob’s performance E{CB} with the mapping-
varied spatial modulation are presented in Fig. 5, whereMA =
4, NB = 2, NE = 2, 4, and the MIMO channel over the wire-
tapper link, G, is spatially white and perfectly known at Eve.
The spatially correlated MIMO channel over the legitimate
link, denoted by HSC , is expressed by the exponential corre-
lation model as [29], [30]
HSC = (ΛB)
1/2H(ΛA)
1/2, (32)
where the NB×NB matrix ΛB =
[
λ
|i−j|
B
]
i,j=1,2,··· ,NB
speci-
fies the correlation between Bob’s antennas and theMA×MA
matrix ΛA =
[
λ
|i−j|
A
]
i,j=1,2,··· ,MA
specifies the correlation
between Alice’s antennas, with λB , λA ∈ (0, 1) defining the
correlation parameters for Bob and Alice, respectively. The
NB × MA matrix H is the spatially white MIMO channel
over the legitimate link, as described in Section II-A. In Fig.
5, the correlation parameters λB = λA = 0.8. Due to the
spatial correlation, both E{Cs} and E{CB} have less than
1dB loss; i.e., spatial correlation has very little influence on
the performance of mapping-varied spatial modulation.
With channel estimation, the channels coefficients from the
mth antenna of Alice to all the antennas of Bob can be
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Fig. 6. Ergodic secrecy rate of the proposed mapping-varied spatial
modulation with finite-alphabet input, in the case of Md = MA = 4, over
i.i.d. and i.n.i.d. links. Also shown is Bob’s ergodic data rate, which is equal
to the ergodic data rate of classical spatial modulation.
expressed by [28], [30]
hm = hˆm + h˜m, (33)
where the NB × 1 vector hˆm is the minimum mean square
error (MMSE) estimation of the real channels coefficients, and
the NB×1 vector h˜m represents the channel estimation error.
In Fig. 5, a single pilot symbol is appropriately interspersed
with the data at each transmit antenna and, thus, the variance
of the channel estimation error, i.e., the MMSE, is given by
σ2
h˜
= 1/(1 + ρ). As the channel fading block length is much
greater than 1, the resource consumption of a single pilot
can be neglected. As is shown in the figure, both E{Cs} and
E{CB} get worse at low SNRs due to the channel estimation
error; however, there is no difference between the performance
with channel estimation and the performance with perfect CSI
in the high-SNR region.
Moreover, Fig. 5 also manifests that, in the case of
Gaussian-distributed input, neither more receiving antennas at
eavesdroppers nor higher channel power gain over wire-tapper
links will result in a decline in the security performance of the
mapping-varied spatial modulation.
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of multiple receiving
antennas on the ergodic secrecy rate of mapping-varied spatial
modulation with finite-alphabet input in Fig. 6, where E{Rs}
is compared with E{RB} in the i.i.d. and i.n.i.d. scenarios
with Md = MA = 4. As illustrated in this figure, with the
increase in the number of receiving antennas at Bob, NB,
both E{RB} and E{Rs} are improved a lot. When the number
of receiving antennas at Eve, NE , gets larger, the security
performance E{Rs} decreases a bit at low SNRs. As the
SNR increases, E{RB} converges to log2MA + log2Md and
E{Rs} converges to MA−1MA log2MA+Md−1Md log2Md, with our
proposed mapping-varied spatial modulation.
In Fig. 6, the ergodic secrecy rate E{Rs} of the scheme
proposed in [26] is included as well, which converges to
MA−1
MA
log2MA as the SNR increases. Apparently, our pro-
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Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probability of the proposed mapping-varied spatial
modulation with Gaussian-distributed input, PGauout (ǫ), over i.i.d. and i.n.i.d.
links.
posed mapping-varied spatial modulation achieves better se-
curity performance than the scheme in [26], thanks to extra
decoding uncertainty at eavesdroppers introduced by varying
the radiated-information mapping patterns.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
Herein, we consider the secrecy outage probability, which
is an important metric for physical layer security over fading
channels, defined as the probability that the instantaneous
secrecy rate is less than a target data rate [31], [32]. In the
mapping-varied spatial modulation with Gaussian-distributed
input, the secrecy outage probability is denoted by
PGauout (ǫ) = Pr{Cs < (1 − ǫ)CB}, (34)
where ǫ ∈ (0, 1) is a predetermined small positive quantity,
claiming on the maximum allowable ratio of Eve’s perfor-
mance to Bob’s performance. The target secrecy rate (1−ǫ)CB
is an approximation to Bob’s data rate CB. In particular, ǫ→ 0
implies stringent requirement on the target secrecy rate, while
larger ǫ corresponds to a looser requirement on the target.
In Fig. 7, the secrecy outage probability of the mapping-
varied spatial modulation with Gaussian-distributed input is
plotted versus SNR, where the secrecy outage probability
decreases dramatically with the increase in the number of
antennas at Alice, MA, even if ǫ gets smaller. An interesting
phenomenon is that the secrecy outage probability gets lower
when the number of receiving antennas at Eve, NE , gets
larger. The main reason behind this is that, in the case of
Gaussian-distributed input, the difference among equivalent
fading behaviours of spatial modulation is reduced with the
increase in NE , which results in lower data rate of the antenna
information xa accessing Eve, i.e., lower CEa. Therefore,
even if eavesdroppers set up more receiving antennas than the
legitimate receiver, the security performance of the mapping-
varied spatial modulation is not diminished at all.
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Fig. 8. Secrecy outage probability of the proposed mapping-varied spatial
modulation with finite-alphabet input, PFinout (ǫ), over i.i.d. and i.n.i.d. links.
In the case of finite-alphabet input, the secrecy outage
probability is expressed as
PFinout (ǫ) = Pr{Rs < (1 − ǫ)RB}, (35)
where ǫ ∈ (ǫ0, 1). Based on the limits given in (23) and (30),
we have
ǫ0 =
log2MA/MA + log2Md/Md
log2MA + log2Md
. (36)
The secrecy outage probability of the mapping-varied spatial
modulation with finite-alphabet input is shown in Fig. 8, where
four main insights can be reached for the purpose of system
design concerning physical layer security. Firstly, the secrecy
outage probability decreases with the increase in any of MA,
Md, NB , ǫ or ρ. Secondly, the secrecy outage probability gets
higher when the number of antennas at Eve, NE , increases.
Thirdly, at the same data rate of spatial modulation, log2MA+
log2Md, lower secrecy outage probability is achieved with
larger MA and smaller Md. Fourthly, once the configuration
of MA and Md is fixed, suitable SNR region guarantees the
secure operation with respect to a target ǫ.
In addition, by comparing the i.i.d. and i.n.i.d. scenarios
in Figs. 7 and 8, we may find the same phenomenon in
both cases of Gaussian-distributed input and finite-alphabet
input: In the low-SNR region, the secrecy outage probability
in the i.n.i.d. scenario is higher than that in the i.i.d. scenario;
i.e., the secrecy performance gets worse when Eve’s channel
power gain is higher than Bob’s. However, as the SNR
increases, the secrecy outage probability in the i.n.i.d. scenario
approaches that in the i.i.d. scenario. That is, at high SNRs, the
security performance over a legitimate link is guaranteed by
the mapping-varied spatial modulation even if eavesdroppers’
channel condition is better than the legitimate receiver’s.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the concept of spatial modulation was em-
braced by physical layer security and, thereby, a novel trans-
mission strategy, named mapping-varied spatial modulation,
was proposed to guarantee the confidential information con-
veyed over the legitimate link, when eavesdroppers’ CSI is
unavailable at the transmitter. With the proposed scheme,
the confidential information is modulated and transmitted on
the basis of spatial modulation, while the mapping patterns
of radiated information and antenna information are varied
according to instantaneous CQI pattern of the legitimate link.
As eavesdroppers are blind to the CQI over the legitimate link,
they cannot successfully decode the confidential information.
Subsequently, the secrecy rate of this scheme was for-
mulated and analysed, based on which illustrative numerical
results pertaining to the metrics of ergodic secrecy rate and
secrecy outage probability substantiated the confidentiality
provided by the proposed mapping-varied spatial modulation:
Theoretically, with Gaussian-distributed input, the secrecy rate
approaches the legitimate link data rate, even if an eaves-
dropper sets up more receiving antennas than the legitimate
receiver and/or the channel condition of the wire-tapper link
is better than that of the legitimate link; In practice, with finite-
alphabet input, there is a gap between the secrecy rate and the
legitimate link data rate, while this gap becomes negligible
as the number of input alphabets or the number of transmit
antennas increases.
We remark that, the security key introduced by the mapping-
varied spatial modulation lies in varying the mapping patterns
of spatial modulation, while spatial modulation is a generalized
context as it is composed of traditional constellation modula-
tion and space shift keying. Therefore, varying mapping pat-
terns can be exploited by traditional constellation modulation
or space shift keying as well, to achieve physical layer security.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank the editors and the anony-
mous reviewers for their comments to improve the presentation
of this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Sys.
Tech. Journ., vol. 28, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[2] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Sys. Tech. Journ., vol. 54,
pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[3] A. Hero, “Secure space-time communication,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 49, no. 12, pp. 3235–3249, Dec. 2003.
[4] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. R. D. Rodrigues, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Wire-
less information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54,
no. 6, pp. 2515–2534, June 2008.
[5] P. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. E. Gamal, “On the secrecy capacity of fading
channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 10, pp. 4687–4698, Oct.
2008.
[6] Y. Shiu, S. Chang, H. Wu, S. Huang, and H. Chen, “Physical layer
security in wireless networks: A tutorial,” IEEE Wireless Commun.,
vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 66–74, Apr. 2011.
[7] A. Mukherjee, S.Fakoorian, J. Huang, and A. Swindlehurst, “Principles
of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks: A survey,”
IEEE Commun. Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1550–1573,
Aug. 2014.
[8] R. Esmailzadeh, M. Nakagawa, and A. Jones, “TDD-CDMA for the
4th generation of wireless communications,” IEEE Wireless Commun.,
vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 8–15, Aug. 2003.
[9] C. Chiang, W. Liao, T. Liu, I. Chan, and H. Chao, “Adaptive downlink
and uplink channel split ratio determination for TCP-based best effort
traffic in TDD-based WiMAX networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun.,
vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 182–190, Feb. 2009.
[10] A. Khisti, G. Wornell, A. Wiesel, and Y. Eldar, “On the gaussian MIMO
wiretap channel,” Proc. IEEE Int. Sym. Inf. Theory (ISIT’07), June 2007.
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2018.2824598
Copyright (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
12
[11] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 4961–4972, Aug.
2011.
[12] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 2180–2189, June 2008.
[13] A. Khisti and G. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas
II: the MIMOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 56,
no. 11, pp. 5515–5532, Nov. 2010.
[14] A. Mukherjee and A. Swindlehurst, “Robust beamforming for security
in MIMO wiretap channels with imperfect CSI,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 351–361, Jan. 2011.
[15] Y. Yang and B. Jiao, “Artificial-noise strategy for single-antenna systems
over multi-path fading channels,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Wireless Commun.
and Mobile Computing Conf. (IWCMC’15), Aug. 2015.
[16] Y. Yang and B. Jiao, “Information-guided channel-hopping for high data
rate wireless communication,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 12, no. 4, pp.
225–227, Apr. 2008.
[17] M. D. Renzo, H. Haas, and P. M. Grant, “Spatial modulation for
multiple-antenna wireless systems: A survey,” IEEE Commun. Mag.,
vol. 49, no. 12, pp. 182–191, Dec. 2011.
[18] Y. Yang and S. Aissa, “Information guided channel hopping with an
arbitrary number of transmit antennas,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 16,
no. 10, pp. 1552–1555, Oct. 2012.
[19] Y. Yang, “Information-guided relay selection for high throughput in
half-duplex relay channels,” in Proc. IEEE Global Commun. Conf.
(GLOBECOM), Dec. 2009.
[20] Y. Yang and S. Aissa, “Information-guided transmission in decode-and-
forward relaying systems: Spatial exploitation and throughput enhance-
ment,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10, no. 7, pp. 2341–2351,
July 2011.
[21] Y. Yang, “Spatial modulation exploited in non-reciprocal two-way
relay channels: Efficient protocols and capacity analysis,” IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 64, no. 7, pp. 2821–2834, July 2016.
[22] C. Liu, M. Ma, Y. Yang, and B. Jiao, “Optimal spatial-domain design
for spatial modulation capacity maximization,” IEEE Commun. Lett.,
vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 1092–1095, June 2016.
[23] Y. Shi, M. Ma, Y. Yang, and B. Jiao, “Optimal power allocation in
spatial modulation systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16,
no. 3, pp. 1646–1655, Mar. 2017.
[24] X. Guan, Y. Cai, and W. Yang, “On the secrecy mutual information
of spatial modulation with finite alphabet,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
Wireless Commun. Signal Process. (WCSP), Oct. 2012.
[25] L. Wang, S. Bashar, Y. Wei, and R. Li, “Secrecy enhancement analysis
against unknown eavesdropping in spatial modulation,” IEEE Commun.
Lett., vol. 19, no. 8, pp. 1351–1354, Aug. 2015.
[26] X. Wang, X. Wang, and L. Sun, “Spatial modulation aided physical layer
security enhancement for fading wiretap channels,” in Proc. IEEE Int.
Conf. Wireless Commun. Signal Process. (WCSP), Oct. 2016.
[27] C. Liu, L. Yang, and W. Wang, “Secure spatial modulation with a full-
duplex receiver,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 838–
841, Dec. 2017.
[28] Y. Yang, N. Bonello, and S. Aissa, “An information-guided channel-
hopping scheme for block-fading channels with estimation errors,” in
Proc. IEEE Global Commun. Conf. (GLOBECOM), Dec. 2010.
[29] D. Chizhik, G. Foschini, M.Gans, and R. Valenzuela, “Keyholes, corre-
lations, and capacities of multielement transmit and receive antennas,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 361–368, Apr. 2002.
[30] Y. Yang and S. Aissa, “Information guided communications in MIMO
systems with channel state impairments,” Wireless Commun. and Mobile
Computing, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 868–878, Apr. 2015.
[31] P. Parada and R. Blahut, “Secrecy capacity of SIMO and slow fading
channels,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Sym. Inf. Theory (ISIT’05), Sept. 2005.
[32] J. Barros and M. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wireless channels,” in
Proc. IEEE Int. Sym. Inf. Theory (ISIT’06), July 2006.
Yuli Yang (S’04-M’08) received her Ph.D. degree
in Communications & Information Systems from
Peking University, China, in July 2007. She has been
a Lecturer with the University of Chester, United
Kingdom, since January 2016.
Before joining the University of Chester, she was
an Assistant Professor with Meliksah University,
Turkey, from January 2014 to December 2015, and
a Postdoctoral Fellow with King Abdullah Uni-
versity of Science and Technology, Saudi Arabia,
from January 2010 to December 2013. Her industry
experience includes working as a Research Scientist with Bell Labs Shanghai,
from August 2007 to December 2009, and a Research Intern with Huawei
Technologies, from June 2006 to July 2007. Her research interests include
modelling, design and performance analysis of wireless systems and networks,
specifically on multi-antenna transmissions, cognitive radio and cooperative
communications, heterogeneous networking and physical layer security.
Mohsen Guizani (S’85-M’89-SM’99-F’09) re-
ceived the B.S. (with distinction) and M.S. degrees
in electrical engineering, the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees
in computer engineering from Syracuse University,
Syracuse, NY, USA, in 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1990,
respectively. He is currently a Professor and the ECE
Department Chair at the University of Idaho, USA.
Previously, he served as the Associate Vice President
of Graduate Studies, Qatar University, Chair of the
Computer Science Department, Western Michigan
University, and Chair of the Computer Science De-
partment, University of West Florida. He also served in academic positions
at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, University of Colorado-Boulder,
Syracuse University, and Kuwait University. His research interests include
wireless communications and mobile computing, computer networks, mobile
cloud computing, security, and smart grid. He currently serves on the editorial
boards of several international technical journals and the Founder and the
Editor-in-Chief of Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing journal
(Wiley). He is the author of nine books and more than 500 publications
in refereed journals and conferences. He guest edited a number of special
issues in IEEE journals and magazines. He also served as a member, Chair,
and General Chair of a number of international conferences. He received the
teaching award multiple times from different institutions as well as the best
Research Award from three institutions. He received the 2017 IEEE ComSoc
Recognition Award for his contribution to Wireless Communications. He was
the Chair of the IEEE Communications Society Wireless Technical Committee
and the Chair of the TAOS Technical Committee. He served as the IEEE
Computer Society Distinguished Speaker from 2003 to 2005. He is a Fellow
of IEEE and a Senior Member of ACM.
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2018.2824598
Copyright (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
